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JURISDICTION 
This appeal was within the appellate jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-(3)(j)(1953)(as amended). The case was transferred 
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) by an order dated 
December 23, 2004. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-4 (2)0). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in applying a legal standard of "best efforts" 
that was the functional equivalent of the less exacting "good faith" standard by failing to 
consider a party's diligence as the touchstone of its "best efforts" analysis. The trial 
court's interpretation of a contract is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Pack v. 
Case, 30 P.3d 436, 440 (Utah App. 2001). This issue was preserved on appeal during 
closing arguments of the trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 688.) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Defendants had used their 
"best efforts" in resolving URI's relationship with Morgan Gas & Oil as required by the 
Settlement Agreement dated June 26, 1996. This issue presents a question of fact, which 
is reviewed to determine whether it is clearly erroneous. Pack v. Case, 30 P.3d 436, 440 
(Utah App. 2001). This issue was preserved on appeal during closing arguments of the 
trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 688.) 
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3. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to Defendants based 
on its finding that Defendants were the prevailing party on Plaintiffs' claim that 
Defendants failed to use their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with Morgan 
Gas & Oil where Defendants' tardy compliance with the unwinding requirement only 
came about as a result of Plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking judicial enforcement of the 
unwinding. The question of whether the Defendants were entitled to an award of fees is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 
P.3d 1134, 1145 (Utah 2001). The amount of the award is a fact question which is 
reviewed to determine whether it is clearly erroneous. Id. This issue was preserved on 
appeal during closing arguments of the trial held February 10-12, 2004. (R. at 3466; 
Transcript at 677.) 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no constitutional, statutory, or other provisions of law, the interpretation 
of which is determinative of the issues presented herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Settlement Agreement 
A multiplicity of litigation involving a multitude of parties was settled by way of a 
settlement agreement (the "Settlement Agreement") entered into on June 26, 1996. A 
copy of the Settlement Agreement is included in the addendum as Exhibit "A." Parties to 
the Settlement Agreement included Plaintiffs Mark Jones ("Jones") and Mark 
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Technologies Corp. ("MTC") and Defendants John Fife ("Fife"), Lyle D. Hurd ("Hurd") 
and Utah Resources International ("URI"). 
The Settlement Agreement was comprised of many provisions whereby both the 
Plaintiffs and Defendants assumed responsibility for the completion of various agreed 
upon obligations. At issue in this case, is an obligation found in Paragraph 1.1 of the 
Settlement Agreement which provides: 
1. Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall occur at 
Closing (as defined herein): 
* * * 
1. The Parties hereto shall exercise their best efforts to 
account for, pay, compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing 
contractual relationships between URI and Morgan Gas & Oil Co. 
(Addendum, Exhibit "A," at 3, 8). 
The plain language of this provision requires the Defendants to exercise their "best 
efforts" to effectively unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships 
between URI and Morgan Gas & Oil Co. ("MGO"). The essence of this case is the 
Plaintiffs' contention that the Defendants breached their duty to exercise their "best 
efforts" in unwinding the contractual relationships between URI and MGO. 
3 
B. The unwinding of URI from MGO.1 
From the time the Settlement Agreement was entered into in June of 1996, 
throughout the balance of 1996 and throughout all of 1997, Plaintiffs persistently 
requested that Defendants comply with the Settlement Agreement by taking action to 
wind up URTs relationship with MGO. (R. at 966.) In fact, in June of 1997, Jones made 
a motion in one of the cases settled by the Settlement Agreement requesting that the court 
enforce the Settlement Agreement by ordering Defendants to wind up URTs relationship 
with MGO. URI opposed the Motion. (R. at 964.) Shortly thereafter, Fife told Jones that 
URI would never pay money to MGO to wind up the relationship unless MGO filed a 
lawsuit. (R. at 1099.) By separate letters dated August 21, 1997 and October 10, 1997, 
Jones requested in writing that URI comply with the Settlement Agreement with regard to 
MGO. (R. at 1099.) Jones received no response to his requests. (R. at 1099.) 
Throughout the period, URI provided no information to Jones or its other directors of any 
actions it had taken or was planning to take to wind up the relationship with MGO, and 
1
 The facts set forth in this section do not represent the Plaintiffs' fulfillment of the 
marshaling requirement that is imposed on a party challenging a trial court's finding of 
fact. See Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994). Section II of the 
Argument section contains the Plaintiffs' compliance with the marshaling requirement 
where the Plaintiffs have marshaled every piece of evidence, received both orally and 
through documentary exhibits, that supports the trial court's finding of fact that 
Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URTs business and contractual 
relationships with MGO. However, the facts as set forth in this section are solely 
intended to provide this Court with a factual footing necessary to adjudicating the issues 
raised on appeal. 
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ignored all requests from Jones and MTC for information concerning such actions. (R. at 
966.) As of the time the Plaintiffs' complaint was filed on January 20, 1998 seeking to 
enforce the unwinding provision, no substantial action had been taken to unwind URI's 
relationships with MGO. 
Once Plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Defendants sprung into action in order to 
unwind URI from MGO. The first mention of the MGO unwinding in the minutes of 
URI's board of directors meetings occurred on February 27, 1998, where Fife made a 
motion for a resolution authorizing URI's officers to use their best efforts to wind up the 
contractual relationships with MGO by the end of 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
5w.) Prior to that meeting, the MGO unwinding had never been addressed by URI's 
board of directors. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5a-w.) 
Despite the resolution, URI took no further action to unwind the MGO relationship 
for several months. On June 25, 1998, the trial court heard argument on URI's first 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the MGO claim, and denied the Motion. (R. at 449-
451.) The following week, Fife and URI began their first serious discussions towards 
unwinding the relationship. (R. at 925.) URI and Fife ultimately scheduled a conference 
call for July 15, 1998, and on July 20, 1998, Fife made a written proposal to MGO. (R. at 
15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.) The July 20, 1998 proposal consisted of less than two pages 
and was the first proposal of any kind made by URI since the Settlement Agreement was 
entered two years earlier. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.) 
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After brief discussions, Fife made a revised proposal on August 1, 1998, which 
MGO's president verbally approved. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12e.) The parties made 
further revisions to the proposal and drafted a Letter of Intent dated August 21, 1998 
which was approved by URI's Board of Directors on September 2, 1998. (R. at 15; 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5z.) The process was completed when the parties executed a 
Partnership Settlement Agreement on December 15, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
15.) 
Once Defendants actually began to actively address the MGO unwinding, the 
entire process was completed and documents signed within a period of five months. 
However, from June of 1996 through July of 1998, the only documentary evidence of 
Defendants' effort to unwind from MGO was a two-page spreadsheet prepared on May 
30, 1997 and a board resolution authorizing the officers to act on February 27, 1998. (R. 
at 15; Defendants' Exhibit 19; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.) 
C. Procedural History. 
On January 20, 1998, MTC and Jones filed a complaint alleging, among other 
things, that Defendants had breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement by failing to 
use their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationship with MGO. (R. at 1.) On August 
17, 1998, the Defendants filed an Answer, which included Counterclaims against MTC 
and Jones for breach of the Settlement Agreement and for payment of attorneys fees. (R. 
at 470.) On January 1, 1999, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all 
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claims. (R. at 561.) The Motions were heard on November 12, 1999, and the Court 
entered a Memorandum Decision on January 5, 2000 granting summary judgment and 
dismissing all of MTC and Jones' claims. (R. at 1515, 1516.) 
On February 17, 2000, the Defendants moved for an order awarding attorneys fees 
and costs against Plaintiffs. After briefing and argument, the Motion for attorney's fees 
was granted by a Memorandum Decision dated January 4, 2001. (R. at 1834.) A final 
Judgment Order was entered on February 26, 2001. (R. at 1927.) Plaintiffs filed a Notice 
of Appeal on March 1, 2001. (R. at 1933.) 
On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on 
several of Plaintiffs' claims, including the claim that Defendants had failed to use their 
"best efforts" to unwind the relationships between URI and MGO. (R. at 1956.) This 
Court remanded that issue to the trial court for resolution of the unresolved fact question 
of whether Defendants had breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement by failing to 
use their "best efforts" in unwinding URI's relationships from MGO, and for a 
determination of which party was the "prevailing party" on the claim for purposes of 
awarding attorneys fees. (R. at 1958-1960.) 
After a trial addressing the issues remanded to the trial court, the trial court held 
that Plaintiffs had failed to satisfy their burden of proof to demonstrate, to a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Defendants had not used their "best efforts" to 
unwind and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships with MGO. (R. at 2121.) 
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On November 17, 2004, the trial court entered an Order Regarding Attorneys' Fees in 
which the court awarded attorneys fees and costs to the Plaintiffs in the amount of 
$34,834.02 and attorneys fees and costs to the Defendants in the amount of $110,187.77. 
(R. at 3413.) The court then set the Plaintiffs' award off against the award to Defendants 
and held that Defendants were entitled to attorneys fees and costs in the net amount of 
$75,353.75. (R. at 3413.) 
On December 17, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal (R. at 3418,) and on 
January 7, 2005, Plaintiffs filed their Docketing Statement with this Court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed an error of law by applying an interpretation of "best 
efforts" that fails to consider a party's diligence as the touchstone of the "best efforts" 
analysis. Courts which have distinguished between the "best efforts" standard and that of 
"good faith" have noted that a party's diligence in fulfilling its agreed upon obligation is 
the distinguishing factor between the more exacting "best efforts" standard and the less 
stringent standard of "good faith." While the trial court purported to apply a "best 
efforts" analysis in this case, its failure to scrutinize the diligence with which the 
Defendants attempted to unwind from MGO coupled with the court's focus on the 
reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions, and inactions, rendered the trial 
court's "best efforts" analysis the functional equivalent of the less exacting "good faith" 
standard. 
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The trial court also erred in concluding as a factual matter that Defendants used 
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO. After marshaling the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings, Plaintiffs contend that the clear weight of 
evidence in this case not only shows the trial court erred in holding that Defendants used 
their "best efforts" in unwinding URI's relationship with MGO, but that Defendants 
expended virtually no effort whatsoever to fulfill its obligation to unwind from MGO for 
a period of twenty months. 
Additionally, the clear weight of evidence contradicts the Defendants' assertion 
that URI's unwinding with MGO was a complex issue requiring twenty months of delay. 
Moreover, the facts show that Defendants only began to dedicate any effort whatsoever to 
the unwinding after the Plaintiffs had commenced legal action seeking to judicially 
enforce the unwinding. The clear weight of the evidence in this case shows that the trial 
court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in fulfilling their obligation to 
unwind its relationships with MGO was clearly erroneous. 
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that this Court should remand the award of attorneys 
fees to the trial court for a recalculation of the award based on a finding that Plaintiffs are 
the prevailing party on their claim that Defendants breached the Settlement Agreement by 
failing to use their "best efforts." Plaintiffs contend that because the Defendants only 
complied with the unwinding provision as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit, that the 
Plaintiffs should be deemed the prevailing party as to this claim and the trial court should 
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modify its fee award to reflect this conclusion. Plaintiffs do not challenge the method 
implemented by the trial court in calculating the award of attorneys fees; but rather, 
contend that the trial court should recalculate those fees consistent with a ruling that 
Plaintiffs were the prevailing party. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW BY FAILING 
TO CONSIDER THE DEFENDANTS5 DILIGENCE AS THE 
TOUCHSTONE OF ITS "BEST EFFORTS" STANDARD, AND 
THEREBY APPLIED A LEGAL STANDARD THAT WAS THE 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE LESS EXACTING STANDARD 
OF "GOOD FAITH." 
The trial court erred in applying a legal standard of "best efforts" as provided in 
the Settlement Agreement that was the functional equivalent of a less exacting "good 
faith" standard. The Seventh Circuit has noted that courts applying the "best efforts" and 
"good faith" standards have at times "muddled" these two concepts. Beraha v. Baxter 
Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th Cir. 1992). Jones contends that by focusing 
on the reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions rather than considering the 
diligence with which Defendants attempted to unwind URI's relationships with MGO, the 
trial court effectively "muddled" the distinction between the more stringent "best efforts" 
standard and the less exacting standard of "good faith. 
10 
A. The Legal Standard of "Best Efforts" is More Exacting Then 
That of "Good Faith." 
A party required to use its "best efforts" in the fulfilment of a contractual 
obligation is held to a higher standard of performance than a party required to exercise 
"good faith." The Utah Supreme Court has held that to satisfy the contractual obligation 
of "good faith," a party's actions "must be consistent with the agreed upon common 
purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Pursuant to its plain language, 
"good faith" does not require that a party engage in any specific, timely, or consistent 
efforts to achieve its obligation; but rather, that whatever efforts the party does make, 
however minimal, not be contrary to the other party's expectations. In short, "good faith" 
is a baseline standard which only requires that a party's actions not manifest an attempt to 
sabotage the agreed upon obligation or undermine the other party's expectations. 
In contrast, "best efforts" demands a higher standard of performance and 
accountability. Black's Law Dictionary defines "best efforts" as "[djiligent attempts to 
carry out an obligation." and that "[a]s a standard, a best-efforts obligation is stronger 
than a good-faith obligation." Black's Law Dictionary 152 (7th ed. 1999)(emphasis 
added.) Pursuant to this definition, the distinction between the "stronger" obligation of 
"best efforts" and the less exacting standard of "good faith" is a party's diligent effort to 
fulfill its obligation rather than merely not acting contrary to another party's expectations. 
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In Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., 95 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Utah App. 
2004), this Court held that "best efforts is primarily a subjective standard under which a 
party agrees to do the best that it can regardless of the capabilities of others." This 
definition is further explained by decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. In Macksey v. 
Egan, 633 N.E.2d 408, 414 (Mass.App.Ct. 1994), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals 
held that in the natural sense of the words "[b]est efforts means that a party put its 
muscles to work to perform with the full energy and fairness that the promises and 
reasonable implications of the contract require."2 Additionally, in Gilson v. Rainin 
Instrument, LLC, 2005 WL 1899471 (W.D.Wis. 2005), the court held that the "duty to use 
best efforts requires the defendant to use "reasonable efforts and due diligence" in the 
promotion of the plaintiffs medical supplies. Id. at 5 3 The court also stated that "[b]est 
efforts is a standard that has diligence as its essence" and that when compared to the 
"good^faith" standard "best efforts is the more exacting." 2005 WL 1899471 at 5 quoting 
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in 
Contract Law, 46 U.Pitt. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1984). 
2
 Other courts have followed this reasoning as evidence by Western Geophysical 
Co. v. Bolt Assoc, 584 F.2d 1164, 1170-1171 (2d Cir. 1978); Triple-A Baseball Club 
Assocs. v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225-226 (1st. Cir. 1987); 
Polyglycoat Corp. v. C.P.C Distrib., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
3
 As an unpublished opinion, a copy of the Gilson decisions has been included in 
the addendum and is marked as Exhibit "B." 
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In the natural sense of the words, "best efforts" requires that a party not merely 
intend to do well but that it actually "put its muscles to work" with all "due diligence" and 
"full energy" in attempting to fulfill its obligation. Plaintiffs contend that based on this 
Court's standard for determining "best efforts," a trial court must look to a party's 
diligence in order to properly determine whether that party has in fact exercised "best 
efforts" or whether it has merely acted in "good faith." Given the propensity of courts to 
muddle these two concepts, it is imperative that trial courts consider the diligence of a 
party as the touchstone of its analysis when determining whether "best efforts" have been 
exerted. 
B. The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Appropriate Standard for 
Determining "Best Efforts" By Neglecting to Consider the 
Defendants9 Diligence in Unwinding URFs Relationships with 
MGO. 
The trial court committed an error of law in this case by applying a legal standard 
of "best efforts" that omitted as its touchstone evidence of a party's diligence, thereby 
rendering its analysis virtually identical to the less stringent standard of "good faith." The 
trial court began its analysis by holding that "best efforts" means to "make the best effort 
possible in the context of the circumstances and situation." (R. at 2122.) While at first 
blush this articulation may appear identical to the "best efforts" standard set forth by this 
Court in Carlson, the trial court erred by applying its own definition which focused on the 
reasonableness and intent of the Defendants' actions rather than considering the 
Defendants' diligence, or lack thereof, in attempting to unwind URTs relationships with 
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MGO. The trial court's emphasis on the reasonableness of the Defendants' actions and 
the Defendants' intent is essentially a "good faith" rather than "best efforts" analysis. 
The trial court concluded that it could not be said that Defendants failed to use 
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO where "[defendants also 
had a fiduciary obligation to accomplish their contractual obligation to the benefit of 
URI" and that "[s]evering the relationship with MGO would be a relatively easy task, if 
URI's best interests were ignored." (R. at 2122.) Moreover, the trial court concluded that 
Fife had to first "resolve specific situations both directly and indirectly connected to the 
MGO unwinding" and that Fife was justified in assigning varying degrees of priority to 
different tasks "both within the unwinding process, and in relation to all activities 
connected with his performance as president of the corporation." (R. at 2122.) In short, 
the trial court rationalized the Defendants' lack of diligence on the grounds of 
reasonableness, rather than applying a "best efforts" standard that focuses on a party's 
diligence. 
The fact that Fife chose to "first marshal, organize and analyze the records of 
URI," ( r at 2122,) before taking action may be considered reasonable, and thereby satisfy 
the "good faith" standard, but a twenty month gap wherein URI had absolutely no 
communications with MGO to discuss the unwinding is clearly indicative of a lack of 
diligence. Fife's decision to prioritize other matters ahead of the unwinding may have 
been reasonable given the disorganized state of URI, but the failure to even mention the 
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unwinding with MGO at URI's board meetings from July 305 1996 through February 27, 
1998 again indicates a complete lack of diligence. While there was no evidence that Fife 
or the other Defendants intended to frustrate or sabotage the unwinding with MGO, such 
evidence only satisfies a "good faith" standard and not the more exacting standard of 
"best efforts." 
It is interesting to note that only after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit on January 20, 
1998 to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement did Defendants suddenly engage 
in a flurry of activity in an attempt to unwind URI from MGO. This sudden burst of 
activity, in immediate response to the lawsuit begs the question of what circumstances 
changed from one day to the next that suddenly allowed URI to put its muscles to work in 
unwinding its affairs with MGO. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' level of activity 
regarding the MGO unwinding after the Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed is representative of 
what constitutes the Defendants' "best efforts" in this case. 
The trial court committed an error of law by failing to consider the Defendants' 
diligence as the touchstone of the "best efforts" analysis. Plaintiffs contends that only by 
considering the degree of diligence a party has undertaken to fulfill its contractual 
obligation can the "best efforts" standard be determined and distinguished from the less 
exacting standard of "good faith." In this case, the trial court conducted a subjective 
analysis that looked to the Defendants' intent and reasonableness of actions rather than 
scrutinizing URI's diligence, or lack thereof, in the fulfillment of its contractual 
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obligation to unwind from Morgan. Accordingly, the trial court committed an error of 
law by effectively muddling the "best efforts" standard with that of "good faith." 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS USED THEIR 
"BEST-EFFORTS" IN UNWINDING URI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
MGO IS SO LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court's finding that Defendants used their 
"best-efforts" in unwinding URI's relationships with MGO was clearly erroneous based 
on the facts in evidence. To successfully challenge a trial court's factual findings, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that 
despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against 
the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Jacobs v. 
Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994) quoting In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989). In this case, despite marshaling all of the evidence that supports the 
trial court's factual finding that Defendants used their "best efforts," the trial court's 
finding was against the clear weight of evidence and is clearly erroneous. 
The trial court's holding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in unwinding 
URI's relationships with MGO was based primarily on Fife's testimony that there were 
complex issues involved and that Fife needed time to navigate his way through those 
issues and to ease John Morgan ("Morgan") into the complexities of the deal. Fife also 
testified that he met with Morgan various times to discuss the unwinding, and that there 
were other priorities that URI needed to dispense of before it could fulfill its obligation to 
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unwind from Morgan. Plaintiffs have marshaled the evidence that supports the trial 
court's findings below with appropriate citations to the record and trial transcript and has 
categorized the evidence in support of the trial court's findings as either: (1) evidence in 
the form of oral testimony taken at trial, or (2) evidence in the form of exhibits submitted 
at trial. 
Evidence Received at Trial as Oral Testimony: 
Testimony of Lyle D. Hurd: 
• After the Settlement Agreement, the board had an ongoing dialogue 
regarding how to take care of the unwinding with Morgan pursuant 
to the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 157.) 
• Unwinding with Morgan was probably one of Mr. Jones' very strong 
priorities. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 159.) 
Testimony of Mark Jones: 
• Liability for an environmental remediation and a promissory note 
obligation served as obstacles to completing the unwinding of URI 
and Morgan. (R. at 3464; Transcript at 184-185.) 
• The unwinding of URI from Morgan came up at URI board meetings 
and the board simply said they were working on it. (R. at 3464; 
Transcript at 205.) 
• Discussions at numerous board meetings discussing the progress 
with that unwinding. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 311.) 
• There may have been one conversation between Mr. Bennion and 
Mr. Eldgredge concerning the winding up. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 
314.) 
• URI participated in negotiations with at least one other party to enter 
into a partition agreement regarding the Southgate Resort Limited 
Partnership. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 318-319.) 
17 
Testimony of J. Michael Bennion: 
Remembered meeting with Ladd Eldredge of URI to discuss the 
separation of URI and Morgan on October 4,1996. (R..at 3465; 
Transcript at 395.) 
Ladd Eldredge of URI had prepared a spreadsheet in November of 
1995 to discuss the financial interests shared between URI and 
Morgan and important debts that Morgan owed to URI. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 396.) 
Was satisfied that between July 1, 1998 and August 26, 1998, URI 
was using its best efforts to bring about a resolution. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 413.) 
Was satisfied that between August 26, 1998 and December 15, 1998, 
URI was using its best efforts to finalize the deal. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 414.) 
Because the assets and liabilities of Morgan, the Morgan Sheltered 
Trust, John H. Morgan, Jr., individually, and the John H. Morgan, Sr. 
Estate, that the parties were concerned about how those assets and 
liabilities would be accounted for in any final settlement between 
URI and Morgan. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 420.) 
Agreed that any unwinding of the Service Station had to consider the 
interests and liabilities or tax consequences that might be assigned to 
each limited partner. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 421.) 
Agreed that any unwinding of Southgate Plaza Limited Partnership, 
or the Southgate Plaza general partnership also had to consider the 
interests of the other partners. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 423.) 
Agreed that after his departure from URI in 1994, URI's records 
were not in the most organized state. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 426.) 
Stated that he was aware that URI had other things on its plate that 
required its attention. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 428.) 
Agreed that in 1996, URI had a new board and that the board was at 
an informational disadvantage in terms of understanding all of the 
issues that had been in existence for many years. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 429.) 
Some time was likely required on URI's part to figure out the 
muddle of surviving issues. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 429.) 
Agreed that there was back-up information that had to be located. 
(R. at 3465; Transcript at 433.) 
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• The Southgate Plaza partition was integrally tied to the winding up 
of URI and Morgan because Morgan was a one-third partner in it. 
(R. at 3465; Transcript at 441.) 
Testimony of John Fife: 
• When he arrived on the scene in 1996 he and URI spent a 
considerable amount of time in the investigative process getting to 
know the parties involved in the different asset partnerships. (R. at 
3466; Transcript at 500.) 
• Testified that he spoke to Allen Roth about the issues and the 
complexities of the partnership tax and exposure and liabilities URI 
might have. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 500.) 
• During 1997 URI sold the service station which he believed to be a 
required step in the unwinding. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 501.) 
•• Believed the sale of the service station was vital because URI could 
not separate out an environmentally contaminated building and land 
to any particular partner and that URI had to liquidate the service 
station and pay out the assets. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 501.) 
• Fife personally and URI took on an environmental remediation 
obligation after the sale of the service station. (R. at 3466; 
Transcript at 506.) 
During 1997 URI had to deal with the Plaza General Partnership 
which had about 6.6 acres of commercial grade land to facilitate the 
unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 507.) 
• A partition of the Plaza General Partnership was necessary to 
effectuate the unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 
509.) 
• Spoke with John Morgan a lot to keep Morgan informed of what 
URI was doing with respect to the Service Station and Plaza General 
plot of ground. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 510.) 
• URI prioritized its obligations pursuant to the settlement agreement 
according to what they deemed to be the most significant and the 
most economic and that there were numerous complexities that faced 
URI. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 510-514.) 
• URI prepared documents summarizing payments, assets, liabilities 
and partnerships involving Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 514-
518.) 
• URI and Fife used their best efforts to bring about the unwinding of 
URI and Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 559.) 
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• His priority was to focus on those things that were the most 
economic and provided the largest savings for URL (R. at 3466; 
Transcript at 562.) 
• URI had to dedicate many of its efforts to dissolving varying 
partnerships revolving around URI's relationship with Morgan in 
order to unwind. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 577-580.) 
He had to spend time to give John Morgan the chance to understand 
issues, think about the implications, and feel comfortable with 
everything in order to complete the unwinding and that he could not 
push John Morgan along. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 591.) 
He met with John Morgan whenever he could and other directors of 
Morgan to discuss, among other things, the unwinding of URI and 
Morgan. (R. at 3466; Transcript at 591-592.) 
The whole matter of unwinding with Morgan and dissolving its 
associated partnerships and dealing with the surviving liabilities as 
well as complying with other terms of the Settlement Agreement was 
more complicated than he originally thought and that he had to bring 
in legal counsel to help sort through the information. (R. at 3466; 
Transcript at 622-623.) 
Evidence Received at Trial as Exhibits that Support the Trial Court's Factual 
Finding: 
Letter from John Fife to Mark Jones dated April 12, 1997 explaining 
the complexity of unwinding with Morgan. (R. at 15; Defendants' 
Exhibit 18.) 
• Summary spreadsheet summarizing partnerships involving Morgan 
prepared May 30, 1997. (R. at 15; Defendants' Exhibit 19.) 
URI Board Minutes for Friday, February 27, 1998. Resolution 
authorizing use of best efforts to complete the wind up of the MGO 
contracts by year-end 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.) 
• Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan 
unwinding dated July 20, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12c.) 
Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan 
unwinding dated August 1, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12e.) 
• Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan 
unwinding dated August 7, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12i.) 
• Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan 
unwinding dated August 21, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
12k.) 
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Letter from John Fife to John Morgan regarding URI/Morgan 
unwinding dated August 26, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
12m.) 
• URI Board Minutes for September 2, 1998: Fife reports that he is 
working with John Morgan to complete the URI/Morgan unwinding. 
(R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5z.) 
• URI Board Minutes for November 11, 1998: Fife reported on the 
URI/Morgan wind up. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5aa.) 
Despite the evidence marshaled above, Plaintiffs contends that the clear weight of 
the evidence in this case contradicts the trial court's finding that Defendants used their 
"best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships with MGO and the finding should be 
reversed as clearly erroneous. The trial court's finding is contradicted by the weight of 
evidence in this case that establishes: (1) the unwinding between URI and MGO had 
already been contemplated and was not as complicated nor intricate a matter as 
Defendants contend, and (2) it was only after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit to enforce the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement that Defendants began to exert any diligence at all in 
attempting to complete the unwinding process 
A. The Clear Weight Of The Evidence Establishes That The 
Unwinding Between URI And MGO Had Previously Been 
Contemplated And Was Neither a Complicated Nor Intricate 
Matter Requiring Thirty Months To Complete. 
The trial court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URI's 
relationship with MGO was erroneous based on evidence that shows that the unwinding 
was not so complex a matter as to justify the lengthy delay in unwinding. While 
Defendants presented some evidence that its unwinding with MGO presented numerous 
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complexities including liabilities, expenses and assets that needed to be liquidated, the 
clear weight of evidence shows that even before the Settlement Agreement was executed, 
the two parties had already discussed most of the issues relating to the unwinding. The 
evidence shows that MGO was completely cooperative and willing to unwind from the 
outset, and that the issues Defendants contend were integral to the unwinding were 
neither essential nor complex at all. In the end, the evidence shows that once Defendants 
stopped ignoring the issue and began serious efforts toward unwinding the relationship, 
an agreement in principle was reached within several days and the whole matter was 
concluded in less than five months. 
Testimony was received at trial that established that both URI and MGO had been 
involved in serious discussions prior to the Settlement Agreement addressing specific 
issues regarding their unwinding, and that MGO had already sent several correspondences 
to URI setting forth the manner in which the relationship could be unwound properly. (R. 
at 3464; Transcript at 193-194.) The fact that URI and MGO had already engaged in 
serious discussion involving the issues regarding the unwinding shows that the two 
parties had already laid the groundwork for completing the unwinding. Moreover, 
testimony was given stating that MGO was completely interested and willing to complete 
the unwinding. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 397.) 
Defendants also attempted to show that there were numerous issues involved in the 
unwinding that required lengthy and prolonged analysis. This contention is contradicted 
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by the evidence of this case. Evidence was received at trial that MGO's interest in 
Service Station No. 2 did not require the sale of the Service Station, and that such a sale 
had no bearing whatsoever on the unwinding between URI and MGO. (R. at 3465; 
Transcript at 367-368.) Additionally, the partition regarding the Southgate Plaza General 
Partnership and Southgate Resort General Partnership land was not a necessary 
prerequisite to unwinding either. (R. at 3465; Transcript at 368.) 
While Defendants may have assigned a lower priority to fulfilling its obligation 
to unwind its relationship with MGO, even with a lower priority, the unwinding should 
not have taken over two years to effectuate, particularly given the willingness of MGO to 
complete the unwinding and the groundwork that had already been established to 
complete it. Additionally, the resolution of issues such as the sale of Service Station No. 
2 and the Southgate Partition were not essential nor integral to the MGO unwinding. 
Accordingly, the evidence shows that Defendants did not use their "best efforts" to 
unwind its relationship with MGO. 
B. The Clear Weight Of The Evidence Establishes That Defendants 
Only Began To Exert Their "Best Efforts" To Complete The 
Unwinding With MGO When Plaintiffs Filed Their Lawsuit To 
Enforce the Terms Of The Settlement Agreement. 
The clear weight of evidence shows that Defendants only began to diligently 
pursue the unwinding with MGO as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit to seek judicial 
enforcement of the unwinding. The evidence is clear that: (1) there were no 
correspondence from the Defendants to MGO regarding the unwinding until after the 
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Plaintiffs' lawsuit was filed; (2) there was never any mention of the MGO unwinding in 
any of URI's board meetings prior to the Plaintiffs' lawsuit; and (3) there were no internal 
memoranda or work product aside from a single two-page spreadsheet prepared in May of 
1997 prior to the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. In short, the Defendants only exercised 
their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationship from MGO after the Plaintiffs filed their 
lawsuit. 
URI has failed to produce any documentary evidence to show that it either 
contacted Morgan regarding the wind-up or even discussed the wind-up internally. 
From the time the Settlement Agreement was entered into in June of 1996 until the time 
the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement in 
January of 1998, the only documentary evidence that shows Defendants' attempt to; 
unwind is a single two-page spreadsheet prepared on May 30, 1997 that details the 
various asset and liability values of URI and MGO's shared partnerships. (R. at 15; 
Defendants' Exhibit 19.) This is the extent of Defendants' documentary evidence 
showing they used their "best efforts" in attempting to unwind with MGO prior to the 
lawsuit in January of 1998. During this gap period there are no letters written to MGO 
discussing the various issues involving the wind-up or internal memoranda analyzing the 
wind-up. There are no minutes or notes from meetings between URI and MGO and there 
are no proposals prepared by URI to send to MGO for its approval. There is simply a 
two-page spreadsheet listing assets and liabilities of the shared partnerships. 
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Moreover, on May 21, 1997, Jones' legal counsel sent a letter to Fife's legal 
counsel inquiring as to why nothing had been accomplished with respect to the unwinding 
from MGO per the terms of the Settlement Agreement and accusing URI of failing to 
fulfill its obligation to use "best efforts." (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 7.) Interestingly, 
when Fife's attorney responded to this accusatory letter, he made no mention of a single 
thing URI had been doing to refute Jones' claims that URI was failing in its duty to use 
"best efforts." (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8.) There was no mention in the letter of any 
efforts or actions the Defendants had taken in furtherance of the unwinding. Instead, the 
letter simply stated that Defendants had other priorities and that Jones had no right to tell 
Defendants what they should be doing. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8.) 
The only activity that Defendants took to advance the unwinding with MGO came 
about solely as a result of the legal action commenced by the Plaintiffs in 1998. Plaintiffs 
submitted into evidence the minutes from URI's board meetings that were held from June 
5, 1996 through November 11, 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5a-aa.) The first time 
the subject of unwinding with MGO is even mentioned comes in the first meeting 
following the filing of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit held on February 17, 1998, when a 
resolution was passed authorizing use of best efforts to complete the wind up of the MGO 
contracts by year-end 1998. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w.) The minutes show that 
there was absolutely no discussion at all in any of the board meetings regarding the MGO 
unwinding until after the Plaintiffs' lawsuit had been filed. However, once the lawsuit 
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was filed, the minutes from every subsequent board meeting included notes on the 
unwinding with MGO. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5w-aa.) Additionally, the only time 
any internal memorandum appear discussing the unwinding occurs after the lawsuit was 
filed. (R. at 15; Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12a-u.) Defendants' flurry of activity to unwind its 
relationships with MGO occurred only after Plaintiffs initiated legal proceedings in an 
attempt to compel the Defendants to honor the terms of the Settlement Agreement entered 
almost two-years prior. The sudden proliferation of internal memoranda regarding the 
unwinding along with the sudden interest the URJ board took in discussing the unwinding 
were both nonexistent until Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. 
The trial court's finding that Defendants used their "best efforts" in the resolution 
and unwinding of its relationship with MGO is contrary to the clear weight of evidence in 
this case. Defendants' contention that the unwinding was a complex matter that 
necessitated a prolonged delay is erroneous when the evidence showed that URI's sale of 
Service Station No. 2 had no relevance to the unwinding with MGO and that the 
Southgate Plaza Limited Partnership partition only involved assigning a one-third value 
of the 6.6 acre plot to MGO. Additionally, the evidence shows that MGO was a willing 
partner in the wind-up and that the two parties had discussed the relevant issues of the 
wind-up prior to the Settlement Agreement's directive. Furthermore, the clear weight of 
evidence shows that the Defendants only exercised their "best efforts" to unwind with 
MGO as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
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The evidence, as marshaled above, does not support a finding that Defendants used 
their "best efforts" until after the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit. Accordingly, the trial 
court's conclusion that Defendants used their "best efforts" to unwind URI's relationships 
with MGO should be reversed as clearly erroneous, and Plaintiffs should be deemed the 
prevailing party on their claim. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO 
THE DEFENDANTS AS THE PREVAILING PARTY WHERE 
DEFENDANTS ONLY WOUND UP URI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH 
MGO AS A RESULT OF THE PLAINTIFFS' LAWSUIT SEEKING 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE WIND-UP PROVISION. 
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants were not entitled to an award of attorneys fees 
as the prevailing party where Defendants only wound up URI's relationship with MGO as 
the result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a party is a 
"prevailing party" if the opposing party's tardy compliance with an obligation comes as a 
result of a lawsuit. Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, Plaintiffs do not challenge the method used by the trial court to calculate its 
fee award, but rather, Plaintiffs contend that they should be considered the prevailing 
party since the evidence shows that Defendants' tardy compliance with the wind-up 
provision came about only as a result of the Plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
As briefed extensively above, the record shows that only after the Plaintiffs filed 
their lawsuit in January of 1998 did the Defendants begin to display any diligence at all in 
attempting to unwind from MGO. Once the Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, the Defendants 
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sprung into action and discussed the MGO unwinding at URI's subsequent board 
meetings, sent numerous correspondence to MGO regarding the unwinding and 
completed the unwinding in less than five months, whereas for the twenty months prior to 
the January, 1998 lawsuit, the Defendants sole effort to unwind took the form of a two-
page spreadsheet. 
The clear weight of evidence shows that Defendants' compliance with the 
Settlement Agreement's directive to unwind URI's relationships with MGO came about 
solely as the result of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. Therefore, according to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Highland Construction, the Plaintiffs should be deemed the 
"prevailing party" for purposes of its claim that Defendants failed to use their "best 
efforts" in unwinding, and the fee award should be vacated and remanded to the trial 
court for a recalculation of the award consistent with a finding that the Plaintiffs were the 
prevailing party on their claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to reverse 
the decision of the trial court. 
DATED this ( j ^day of November, 2005. 
WOODBURY & KESLER, P 
iid W. Lambert, 
Anthony M. Grove 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is entered into the day of 
June, 1996 among the following parties (collectively referred to herein as the "Parties"): 
1. Utah Resources International, Inc., a Utah corporation ("URI"). 
2. R. Dee Erickson ("Erickson"). 
3. E. Jay Sheen ("Sheen"). 
4. Lyle D. Hurd ("Hurd"). 
5. Mark G. Jones ("Jones"). 
6. Mark Technologies Corporation, a California corporation ("MTC"). 
7. Anne Morgan ("A Morgan"). 
8. Victoria Morgan ("V Morgan"). 
9. Inter-Mountain Capital Corp., a Delaware corporation ("IMC"). 
10. John Fife ("Fife"). 
11. Robinson &. Sheen, L.L.C. 
R E C I T A L S 
A. The Parties are involved in various disputes and controversies involving the 
operation, management, ownership of and business activities of URI, including, but not limited 
to,, matters which ate the subject of the First State Action, the Second State Action and the First 
Federal Action as defined below (collectively, the 'Tending Litigation")-
B. A shareholders derivative action captioned as Ernest Muth, et al. v. John H. 
Morgan. Jr. et al. was filed as Civil Number C-87-1632 in the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Utah (the "First State Action"). 
C. A settlement agreement was entered into in the First State Action on April 6, 1993 
(the " 1993 Settlement Agreement"). 
D. Subsequently, URI brought an action to enforce the 1993 Settlement Agreement 
in the First State Action which resulted in certain findings of fact and conclusions of law and an 
order enforcing the Settlement Agreement entered by Judge Michael R. Murphy on October 4, 
1995 (the "Murphy Order"). The Murphy Order has been appealed by JH Morgan and 
DR Morgan and cross-appealed by URI. 
E. An Order to Show Cause has been filed in the First State Action by URI against 
JH Morgan, DR Morgan, Mark Jones, MTC, Anne Morgan and Victoria Morgan, which is 
pending. 
F. A shareholders derivative action captioned as Anne Morean et. al v. R. Dee 
Erickson et. al was filed as Case Number 2:95CV-0661C in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division (the "First Federal Action"). 
G. Pursuant to a Plan of Share Exchange and Share Exchange Agreement dated 
February 16, 1995 among URI, Midwest Railroad Construction and Maintenance Corporation of 
Wyoming, a Wyoming corporation ("Midwest"), Robert D. Wolff ("RD Wolff') and Judith J. 
Wolff ("JJ Wolff')* URI acquired all outstanding shares of Midwest from RD Wolff and JJ Wolff 
in exchange for 590,000 restricted shares of authorized but unissued shares of URI (the "Share 
Exchange Agreement"). 
H. In April of 1996 URI and Midwest, RD Wolff and JJ Wolff entered into a 
Split-Off Agreement pursuant to which the Share Exchange Agreement was rescinded in a 
transaction intended to qualify as a tax-free spin-off under the provisions of Section 355 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the "Recision Agreement"). 
I. On April 5, 1996 URI entered into a letter of intent with IMC to sell a controlling 
interest in URI to IMC upon terms and conditions set forth therein (the "IMC Letter of Intent"), 
attached as Exhibit A and by this reference made a pan hereof. The IMC Letter of Intent was 
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modified pursuant to a letter of May 31, 1996, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B and by 
this reference made a part hereof. The IMC Letter of Intent is modified pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement. 
^s* 
J. Fife is the sole shareholder of IMC. 
K. On May 17, 1996, a Complaint captioned as Mark Technology Com., et. al. v. 
Utah Resources International. Inc.. et. al. was filed as Civil No. 96 090 3332CV in the Third 
Judicial Court of Salt Lake County, Utah (the "Second State Action"). 
L. The Second State Action included a request by MTC and others for a temporary 
restraining order and injunction against the transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of 
Intent, which request shall be rescinded in accordance with the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement. 
M. The Parties believe this Agreement is fair to and in the best interest of URI and all 
shareholders of URI. 
N. The Parties have agreed to compromise and settle all of their disputes and claims 
known or unknown, now existing or hereafter accruing, including, but not limited to, those which 
are the subject of the Pending Litigation, upon the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein and for 
other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are hereby 
acknowledged, the parties agree as follows: 
1. Unless otherwise provided, the following events shall occur at Closing (as defined 
herein): 
a. The Parties agree they will use best efforts immediately following the 
Closing to petition the Court in the First State Action for the purpose of terminating the 
1993 Settlement Agreement Pending such termination, the Parties agree the 1993 
Settlement Agreement and the Murphy Order shall continue in accordance with their 
respective terms and provisions. 
b. The Parties agree to dismiss the Pending Litigation with prejudice, to 
dismiss the Order to Show Cause referenced in the Recitals above, and agree to request 
the Court to remove the temporary restraining order granted in the Second State Action 
on the date of execution of this Agreement. The Parties agree, upon execution of this 
Agreement, to take immediate steps to file for dismissal of the Pending Litigation. The 
Parties will use their best efforts, in good faith, to obtain the dimissals within 60 days of 
the date hereof. Notice shall be given to shareholders of URI in such manner as each 
court directs. 
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c. The closing of the transactions contemplated herein ("Closing") shall 
occur at the offices of Robinson & Sheen in Salt Lake City, Utah, no later than seven (7) 
calendar days after the date hereof. 
d. Except for those matters specifically set forth in this Agreement which 
create continuing future rights and obligations of the Parties, the Parties hereto, and each 
of them, for themselves, their respective predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and 
controlling affiliated corporations and entities, past and present, as well as the respective 
directors, officers, stockholders, parmers, agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past 
and present, and affiliates or nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934), heirs, assigns, predecessors and successors in interest, and each 
of them, effective upon Closing of this Agreement, hereby acknowledge full and 
complete satisfaction of, and do hereby release and discharge and covenant not to sue the 
other of them, including their respective heirs, assigns and successors in interest, parents, 
predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and controlling affiliated corporations and entities, 
past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders, partners, 
agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or nominees of 
parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of them, from 
any and all claims, demands, and causes or sources of action of whatever kind or nature, 
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all rights of and claims for 
contribution and indemnification, and judgments, which any of them now owns or holds 
or has at any time heretofore owned or held through the date of the Closing of this 
Agreement against any of the other of them, including, but not limited to, those which: 
(i) are or could have been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or 
final orders, rulings, file, or papers in the Pending Litigation; or (ii) arise out of, or are 
related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with any transactions, 
occurrences, acts or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the 
Pending Litigation. This provision shall receive the broadest possible interpretation as a 
general and complete release. 
URI agrees to and shall fully indemnify hold harmless, and defend all other 
Parties to this Agreement including their respective heirs, assigns and successors in 
interest, parents, predecessors, subsidiaries, controlled and affiliated corporations and 
entities, past and present, as well as the respective directors, officers, stockholders, 
parmers, agents, attorneys, servants, and employees, past and present, and affiliates or 
nominees of parties (as defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), and each of 
them, from and against any and all claims, demands, and causes or sources of action of 
whatever kind or nature, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, including all 
rights of and claims for contribution and indemnification, and judgments, which 
Midwest, RD Wolff or JJ Wolff now owns or holds or has at any time heretofore owned 
or held through the date of the Closing of this Agreement against any of the Parties hereto 
other than URI, including, but not limited to, those which (i) are or could have been 
alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings, file, 
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or papers in the First State Action; or (ii) arise out of, or are related to, or are in any wav 
connected directly or indirectly with any transactions, occurrences, acts or omissions set 
forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the First State Action; (iii) are or could have 
been alleged or set forth in any of the pleadings, any interlocutory or final orders, rulings, 
file, or papers in the Second State action; or (iv) arise out of or are related or are in any 
way connected directly or indirectly with any transaction, occurrences, acts or omissions 
set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in the Second State Action; or (v) arise out 
of, or are related to, or are in any way connected with any transactions, occurrences, acts 
or omissions set forth, or facts alleged, in the papers on file in said Federal Action; 
(vi) arise out of, are related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the 
Share Exchange Agreement or the Recision Agreement; (vii) arise out of, are related to, 
or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with the 1993 Settlement Agreement; or 
(viii) arise out of, or are related to, or are in any way connected directly or indirectly with 
the IMC Letter of Intent. 
e. The Parties agree that Jones shall serve as a director of URI for no less 
than one year from the date of Closing, and the Parties agree to take all actions necessary 
to maintain Jones as a director for said one year period. Sheen and Erickson shall resign 
as members of the Board of Directors of URI as of the date of Closing. The successors to 
Sheen and Erickson as members of the Board of Directors of URI shall be appointed in 
accordance with the terms of the 1993 Settlement Agreement. That Board shall elect Fife 
President and the other appropriate officers of URI. Erickson and Sheen agree that they 
will not seek election as, and will not accept any future nominations to serve as, an officer 
or director of URJ or Morgan Gas & Oil Co. 
f. The transactions contemplated in the IMC Letter of Intent shall close in 
accordance with the provisions of that contemplated Stock Purchase Agreement between 
URI and IMC (the "Stock Purchase Agreement"), the current form of which is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein by this reference as Exhibit "C," subject to negotiation and 
execution of the definitive Stock Purchase Agreement and approval of its terms by the 
URJ Board of Directors; provided, however, that the definitive Stock Purchase 
Agreement must contain the following material provisions: 
i. IMC shall purchase and URI shall issue and sell shares at the Closing so that IMC 
will own following the purchase 50.5% of the total outstanding common stock of URJ at 
S3.3 5 per share as of the Closing, and URI shall issue an option for one hundred fifty 
thousand (150,000) or more additional shares of the capital stock of the Company at an 
exercise price of S3.35 per share, payable in the same fashion as the shares purchased by 
IMC to obtain 50.5% of the total outstanding stock of URI, such that IMC shall have at 
all times the right to own 50.5% of the outstanding common stock of URI; provided, 
however, that the options may only be exercised as corresponding outstanding options 
held by others are exercised; and further provided that IMC shall be entitled to maintain 
its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock of URI in connection with any 
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stock split, recapitalization, combination, or reorganization; and further provided that 
IMC shall be entitled to maintain its 50.5% ownership of the outstanding common stock 
ofURI in connection with any new issuance of stock or the issuance of instruments 
convertible into stock, at the offering price of such new issuance, on payment terms 
similar to those set forth herein; 
ii. IMC shall pay 15% of the purchase price in cash at closing; 
iii. the balance of the purchase price shall be evidenced by a note ("Note") which 
bears interest at a rate equal to the short-term applicable federal rate published by the Internal 
Revenue Service, pursuant to Section 1274(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended, in effect at the time of the Closing, adjusted on each anniversary date of this 
Agreement until the purchase price has been paid in full. 
iv. IMC shall pay the first year's interest in cash at Closing, discounted at the interest 
rate noted in (iii) above, and interest shall be paid annually in arrears on each anniversary of the 
Note thereafter, beginning with the second year's anniversary date, with the principal due and 
payable August 1, 2001; 
v. the Note shall be secured by a pledge of IMC's URI stock; 
vi. John Fife, the sole shareholder and president of IMC, will personally guarantee 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the outstanding balance of the Note; 
vii. after closing, any distributions and other payments otherwise payable to IMC on 
its URI stock will be applied to reduce the outstanding principal balance of the Note; 
viii. subsequent to closing, IMC shall cause URI to cause a 1,000 to 1 share reverse 
split at S3.35 per share; ! 
ix. fractional shareholders of record as of the date of the reverse split shall be given 
the option to purchase additional fractional shares to round up to the next whole share; 
x. URI indemnifies IMC, its shareholders, officers, directors, agents, employees and 
attorneys, including but not limited to those arising out of the negotiation, execution and 
consummation of this Agreement, and including advancement of their legal fees and costs, and 
from and against liability arising out of the IMC Letter of Intent, the Stock Purchase Agreement 
and transactions contemplated hereby; 
xi. IMC shall take all actions necessary to cause URI to honor its obligations to 
indemnify its officers and directors, agents, employees and attorneys, including but not limited to 
those arising out of the negotiation, execution and consummation of this Agreement, and 
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including advancement of their legal fees and costs, in connection with all present and future 
litigation. 
xii. URI shall hire Fife under a written employment agreement which shall provide 
reasonable compensation for services rendered, which compensation in any year shall not exceed 
5200,000. The payment of compensation in excess of that provided in the employment 
agreement shall be used to reduce any obligations due or to become due under the Note. 
xiii. The Parties covenant to provide a copy of the definitive Stock Purchase 
Agreement to Jones and counsel of his choosing at least two days prior to the Closing, to review 
for consistency with the provisions above. 
f. The number of shares acquired by URI in the reverse split contemplated in 
the Stock Purchase Agreement shall be available for purchase by all remaining 
shareholders of URI, other than IMC, as of a record date five days prior to the 
effectuation of the reverse split at a price of S3.3 5 per share; provided, however, that URI 
shall not be required to make the shares available for purchase if to do so would be in 
violation of federal or state securities laws after after URI has taken all actions necessary 
to comply. Notice shall be given to the shareholders of the availability of such purchase 
and to the extent the amount of shares available is oversubscribed, each person 
subscribing for such shares shall be allowed to purchase a pro-rata portion of the 
available shares. The terms of the purchase of such shares by each shareholder shall be a 
cash down payment of 25% with the balance payable in three years with simple interest at 
the short term applicable federal rate for the month of this Agreement which interest shall 
be payable annually in arrears. The obligation shall be secured by a pledge of the stock 
acquired pursuant to a stock pledge agreement to be drafted by counsel for URI. Any 
distributions to shareholders of URI shall first be applied to the unpaid balance of any 
amounts owing URI hereunder. 
g. The 40,552 outstanding shares of URI stock owned by A Morgan and 
V Morgan, which they represent and warrant are all the URI shares they own, shall be 
purchased by URI for a cash price of S3.35 per share which purchase shall occur at 
Closing of this Agreement. 
h. Legal fees and expenses and other costs associated with the Pending 
Litigation and the documents and negotiations to complete and implement the settlement 
contemplated by this Agreement shall be paid as follows: 
(i) All legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or paid by 
Jones, IMC, Fife, Erickson, Sheen, Hurd and MTC from January 1, 1996 to 
Closing shall be reimbursed or paid by URI. 
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(ii) All legal fees, costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or paid by 
V. Morgan and A Morgan, subject to a dollar limitation of 581,000, shall be 
reimbursed or paid by URI. 
(iii) All other expenses incurred, except as provided above, shall be paid 
by the Party incurring such expense. 
i. From the date of this Agreement URI shall be allowed to conduct its 
affairs in the normal course of business, except as otherwise limited or modified by the 
First State Action, the 1993 Settlement Agreement and the Murphy Order. 
j . All employment agreements contemplated, negotiated or executed 
between URI and Sheen, Hurd, and Erickson shall not be effectuated and, if effectuated, 
shall be terminated. 
k. Except for completion of pending matters approved by the Board, 
Robinson & Sheen, L.L.C. shall resign as legal counsel for URI effective at Closing. 
1. The Parties hereto-shall exercise their best efforts to account for, pay, 
compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing contractual relationships between URI 
and Morgan Gas & Oil Co. 
4. Representations and Warranties of the Parties. 
a. The corporate Parties, URI, MTC, and IMC represent and warrant that 
they are validly existing and in good standing in the state of their organization and have 
the full legal right, power and authority to execute and deliver this Agreement and to 
carry out all transactions contemplated herein. Each individual signing this Agreement 
on behalf of a corporation, parmership, trust, or other entity, represents and warrants that 
he or she has the authority to do so. 
b. All Parties represent and warrant that they have negotiated at arms-length 
with a view to arriving at a fair and equitable settlement of their differences, 
c. All Parties represent and warrant that, to the best of their belief, the terms 
of this Agreement are fair to and in the best interests of URI and its shareholders. 
d. All Parties covenant that no actions of any kind shall be undertaken by the 
Parties to affirmatively prosecute the Pending Litigation, nor will the Parties instigate any 
new legal proceedings against any of the other Parties. 
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e. All Parties represent and warrant that they have not assigned or transferred 
any claims against any of the other Parties, including any interest in the Pending 
Litigation, to any third party not a party to this Agreement. 
5. This Agreement has been freely and voluntarily executed by all Parties hereto 
after having been apprised of all relevant information and having been represented by counsel. 
No party hereto has relied upon any inducements, promises or representations made by any other 
party or other party's attorney, other than those specifically set out in this Agreement, which 
constitutes the entire, integrated understanding among the Parties. 
6. Each party agrees to perform such other further acts and to execute and deliver 
such further documents as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this Agreement 
7. The Parties hereto, and each of them, acknowledge that this Agreement is the 
compromise and settlement of the claims and demands between and among the Parties and 
nothing contained herein shall be construed as an admission of their validity or invalidity against 
the interests of the Parties hereto, or any of them, except that this disclaimer does not affect the 
validity or truthfulness of the affirmative statements, admissions, affidavits, filings, notices, and 
writings made and agreed to be made under the terms of this Agreement. 
8. Except as to continuing covenants and obligations set forth in the 1993 Settlement 
Agreement and the Murphy Order, all claims, rights, causes of action, or defenses of the Parties 
raised in the Pending Litigation are herewith merged into and fully resolved as a part of this 
Agreement. 
9. All Parties to this Agreement have read and fully comprehend and understand the 
terms and provisions of this Agreement and of the ancillary exhibits and documents incorporated 
herein. All Parties have been advised by legal counsel who presently represent them in 
connection with this settlement as to the content, meaning and execution of this Agreement. All 
Parties to this Agreement have voluntarily and without coercion signed the same and understand 
and agree to each and every paragraph hereof. 
10. No Party hereto shall, directly or indirectly, solicit or seek to solicit any person to 
challenge any provision hereof or to file suit comparable to any suit dismissed hereunder or to 
contest the dismissal of the Pending Litigation. Tnis covenant of good faith shall be central to 
this Agreement and any Party damaged by a breach thereof shall be entitled to all remedies 
available at law or in equity as well as a recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
11. General Provisions. 
a. Binding Agreement. Tnis Agreement shall be binding upon and shall 
inure to the benefit of the heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns, as 
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applicable, of the respective parties hereto, and any entities resulting from the 
reorganization, consolidation or merger of any party hereto. 
b. Headines. The headings used in this Agreement are inserted for reference 
purposes only and shall not be deemed to limit or affect in any way the meaning or 
interpretation of any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement. 
c. Counterparts. This Agreement may be signed upon any number of 
counterparts with the same effect as if the signature to any counterpart were upon the 
same instrument. 
d. Entire Agreement. This Agreement, together with the exhibits and 
schedules hereto (which are incorporated herein by this reference), constitutes the entire 
agreement and understanding between and among the parties with respect to the subject 
matter hereof and shall supersede any prior agreements and understandings among the 
parties with respect to such subject matter. 
e. Severability. The provisions of this Agreement are severable, and should 
any provision hereof be found to be void, voidable or unenforceable, such void, voidable 
or unenforceable provision shall not affect any other portion or provision-of this 
Agreement. 
f. Survival of Representations. Warranties and Covenants. The 
representations, warranties and covenants of the Parties shall survive the Closing. 
g. Waiver. Any waiver by any party hereto of any breach of any kind or 
character whatsoever by any other party, whether such waiver be direct or implied, shall 
not be construed as a continuing waiver or consent to any subsequent breach of this 
Agreement on the part of the other party. 
h. Modification. This Agreement may not be modified except by.an 
instrument in writing signed by all of the parties hereto. 
i. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be interpreted, construed and 
enforced according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
j . Attorney's Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is brought by any 
Party against any other Party under this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled 
to recover attorney's fees and costs in such amount as the court may adjudge reasonable. 
k. Notice. All notices or other communications required or permitted to be 
given pursuant to this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be considered as properly 
given when personally served or deposited in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
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registered or certified, with return receipt requested, or by prepaid telegram, telecopy or 
deposited with a recognized courier for overnight delivery. Notice given in any such 
manner shall be effective when received or three (3) days after mailing or sending. The 
addresses of the parties shall be as set forth on Schedule 11 .j. attached hereto. 
Each Party shall have the right to change its address for purposes of this section to any other 
location within the continental United States by giving thirty (30) days' notice to the other Parties 
in the manner set forth in this section. 
11. In the event that Closing does not occur for any reason, the term of the 1993 
Settlement Agreement shall be extended by the number of days elapsing between the date hereof 
and the date of the event causing the failure to close. 
DATED the date and year first set forth above. 
URI: 






R. Dee Erickson 
SHEEN: 
E. Jayiftheen ) 
HURD: 
^ - V 
Lyle D. Hurci 
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JONES: 
MarK G. Jones £ / 
MTC: 




Anne Morgan, ini 
V MORGAN: 
Victoria Morgan 




John W SU. / JAT 
Page 12 





Jenny T. Morgan 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
W.D. Wisconsin. 
Robert E. GILSON, M.D., Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation, Gilson Inc., and 
Gilson S.A.S. Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RAININ INSTRUMENT, LLC, Rainin Group, Inc., 
and Mettler-Toledo, Inc., 
Defendants. 
No. 04-C-852-S. 
Aug. 9, 2005. 
Allen A. Arntsen, Foley & Lardner LLP, Madison, 
WI, for Plaintiffs. 
Bruce A. Schultz, Coyne Niess Schultz Becker & 
Bauer, Madison, WI, for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
SHABAZ,J. 
*1 This action for breach of contract and violation 
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) & 
(B), was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in 
plaintiffs' favor finding that defendants materially 
breached the parties' exclusive distributorship 
contract. Plaintiffs opted to terminate the contract, 
and the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs Robert 
E. Gilson and the Wisconsin Alumni Research 
Foundation for lost royalties in the amount of 
$70,000 and to plaintiff Gilson S.A.S. for lost 
profits in the amount of $500,000. Judgment was 
entered accordingly. The matter is presently before 
the Court on plaintiffs' and defendants' Rule 50(b) 
renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law. 
MEMORANDUM 
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law pursuant to Rule 50(b) the Court determines 
whether the evidence presented, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prevailing party and combined 
with all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in 
favor of the prevailing party, is sufficient to support 
the verdict. Tennes v. Mass. Dep't of Revenue, 944 
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir.1991). The Court does not 
reevaluate the credibility of witnesses nor otherwise 
weigh the evidence. Id. 
Liability Verdict: 
At the close of the liability phase of trial, the jury 
was asked two special verdict questions relating to 
plaintiffs' breach of contract claim: 
1. Did defendant Rainin materially breach its 
obligation to use its best efforts to promote and 
sell plaintiff Gilson's Pipetman? 
2. Did Rainin materially breach its obligation to 
promote and sell in good faith Gilson's Pipetman? 
The jury answered "no" to the first question and 
"yes" to the second. 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Defendants maintain two objections to the second 
question. First, they contend that their failure to 
promote and sell in good faith does not support a 
cause of action for breach of contract. Second, they 
repeat their summary judgment argument that the 
parties agreed to an objective performance standard 
by which their compliance with this obligation 
should be measured, which they satisfied by selling 
at least 43,336 Gilson pipettes per year. 
Defendants' first challenge relies on the mantra, 
acknowledged by the Court on summary judgment, 
that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
in § 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC), Wis. Stat. § 401.203, "does not support an 
independent cause of action for failure to perform 
or enforce in good faith." Wis. Stat. § 401.203 cmt; 
Hauer v. Union State Bank, 192 Wis.2d 576, 597, 
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532 N.W.2d 456, 464 (Ct.App.1995). The UCC 
Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) added this 
statement to the § 1-203 Official Comment in 1994. 
The addition reads in full as follows: 
This section does not support an independent 
cause of action for failure to perform or enforce 
in good faith. Rather, this section means that a 
failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a 
specific duty or obligation under the contract, 
constitutes a breach of that contract or makes 
unavailable, under the particular circumstances, a 
remedial right or power. This distinction makes it 
clear that the doctrine of good faith merely directs 
a court towards interpreting contracts within the 
commercial context in which they are created, 
performed, and enforced, and does not create a 
separate duty of fairness and reasonableness 
which can be independently breached. 
*2 Wis. Stat. § 401.203 cmt. The PEB issued 
Commentary No. 10 to clarify the meaning of this 
addition, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals has 
quoted this Commentary with approval. Hauer, 192 
Wis.2d at 597 n. 7, 532 N.W.2d at 464 n. 7. It 
explains: 
The inherent flaw in the view that § 1-203 
supports an independent cause of action is the 
belief that the obligation of good faith has an 
existence which is conceptually separate from the 
underlying agreement.... [T]his is an incorrect 
view of the duty. "A party cannot simply 'act in 
good faith.' One acts in good faith relative to the 
agreement of the parties. Thus the real question is 
'What is the Agreement of the parties?' " Put 
differently, good faith merely directs attention to 
the parties' reasonable expectations; it is not an 
independent source from which rights and duties 
evolve.... Consequently, resort to principles of 
law or equity outside the Code are not 
appropriate to create rights, duties, and liabilities 
inconsistent with those stated in the Code. For 
example, a breach of a contract or duty within the 
Code arising from a failure to act in good faith 
does not give rise to a claim for punitive damages 
unless specifically permitted. 
PEB Commentary No. 10: Section 1-203 (Feb. 10, 
1994), reprinted in Unif. Commercial Code app. 2, 
3B U.L.A. 135, 136-37 (Supp.2002) (quoting 
Dennis Patterson, Good Faith and Lender Liability 
143 (1990)). 
Accordingly, the duty of good faith does not 
provide an independent source of obligations from 
which a court may draw to reform agreements 
because they appear with the benefit of hindsight to 
be inequitable or unreasonable. Original Great Am. 
Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley 
Cookies, Ltd, 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir.1992). 
"Good faith" requires only that a party to an 
agreement perform its obligations under the 
agreement with fidelity to the other party's 
promise-induced reasonable expectations. As 
Professor Corbin explains: 
If the purpose of contract law is to enforce the 
reasonable expectations of parties induced by 
promises, then at some point it becomes 
necessary for courts to look to the substance 
rather than to the form of the agreement, and to 
hold that substance controls over form. What 
courts are doing here, whether calling the process 
"implication" of promises, or interpreting the 
requirements of "good faith," as the current 
fashion may be, is but a recognition that the 
parties occasionally have understandings or 
expectations that were so fundamental that they 
did not need to negotiate about those 
expectations. When the court "implies a promise" 
or holds that "good faith" requires a party not to 
violate those expectations, it is recognizing that 
sometimes silence says more than words, and it is 
understanding its duty to the spirit of the bargain 
is higher than its duty to the technicalities of the 
language. 
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 570 
(West Supp.1993), quoted in PEB Commentary No. 
10: Section 1-203, supra, 3B U.L.A. at 138 n. 13. 
Accordingly, Judge Manion observed for the 
Seventh Circuit in Beraha v. Baxter Health Care 
Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1445 (7th Cir.1992), that 
although the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing does not create "an enforceable legal duty 
to be nice or to behave decently in a general way," 
it does require each party to an agreement to 
exercise any discretion afforded it by the agreement 
in a manner consistent with the reasonable 
expectations of the other party. 
> 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
U + 4 - ~ . / / ,*- , . ~ ~ + 1 , kJP.*U r,*—urnv/ir uPr^o+n^-Ann^^onnnn 11 / u n n n ^ 
Page 4 of7 
Slip Copy 
Slip Copy, 2005 WL 1899471 (W.D.Wis.) 
(Cite as: 2005 WL 1899471 (W.D.Wis.)) 
Page 3 
*3 This is the standard to which defendants have 
been held. The special verdict did not ask whether 
defendants had breached some independent duty of 
good faith or invite the jury to substitute some 
amorphous standard of community morality for the 
parties' reasonable promise-induced and 
investment-backed expectations. Under the parties' 
exclusive dealing agreement, defendants had an 
obligation to promote and sell Gilson's Pipetman 
pipettes. The agreement left to Rainin discretion to 
determine how it would do so. Although the 
agreement allowed Rainin significant discretion in 
this regard, its discretion was not unlimited. To the 
contrary, its discretion was fettered by the 
obligation that it perform its obligation in good faith 
(i.e., in a manner consistent with Gilson's 
reasonable promise-induced expectations). 
Consequently, the Court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT: DUTY OF GOOD 
FAITH 
Under Wisconsin law, the contract between 
Rainin and Gilson requires that each party act in 
good faith towards the other party and deal fairly 
with that party when carrying out the terms of the 
contract. This requirement to act in good faith is a 
part of the contract just as though the contract 
stated it. 
Rainin had an obligation to use good faith when 
promoting and selling Gilson pipettes. Gilson 
claims that Rainin breached its good faith 
obligation by attempting to convince customers to 
purchase Rainin's pipettes instead of Gilson's 
pipettes or by replacing customers' Gilson 
pipettes with Rainin pipettes. 
Whether the duty to act in good faith has been 
met in this case should be determined by deciding 
what the contractual expectations of the parties 
were. Therefore, in deciding whether Rainin 
breached the duty of good faith by attempting to 
convince customers to purchase Rainin's pipettes 
instead of Gilson's pipettes or by replacing 
customers' Gilson pipettes with Rainin pipettes, 
you should determine the purpose of the 
agreement; that is, the benefits the parties 
expected at the time the agreement was made. 
This duty of good faith means honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade. 
The jury was then asked, "Did Rainin materially 
breach its obligation to promote and sell in good 
faith Gilson's Pipetman?" Responding in the 
affirmative, the jury found in Rainin's conduct not a 
breach of some independent duty but a material 
breach of contract, the terms of which found 
meaning in their entirety from the promise-induced 
expectations of the parties. 
Defendants' second challenge repeats their 
summary judgment argument that the parties agreed 
to an objective performance standard by which their 
compliance with their obligation to promote and sell 
in good faith should be measured, which they argue 
that they satisfied by selling at least 43,336 Gilson 
pipettes per year. Although the obligation to 
perform in good faith may not be disclaimed by 
agreement, the parties may agree to determine the 
standard by which the performance of this 
obligation is to be measured. Wis. Stat. § 401.102(3) 
("the obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care prescribed by chs. 401 to 
411 may not be disclaimed by agreement but the 
parties may by agreement determine the standards 
by which the performance of such obligations is to 
be measured if such standards are not manifestly 
unreasonable"). However, as the Court found on 
summary judgment, defendants' argument that the 
parties here intended to set such a standard is 
unpersuasive. Defendants point to the following 
clause within the agreement: 
*4 Provided that Mettler remains the exclusive 
distributor of all Gilson volume adjustable 
mechanical pipettes, if annual sales of 
PRODUCTS by Mettler in the U.S. in any 
calendar year are less than one half the unit 
sales of Current Pipetman Products in calendar 
year 2000, then the Gilsons shall have the right 
by written notice to Mettler to convert Mettler's 
rights under the [1972 Agreement] from 
exclusive to nonexclusive; provided, however, 
that such exclusivity shall not lapse in the event 
such volume limitations are not achieved as a 
result of significant quality problems, Acts of 
God, significant logistical problems, or similar 
events causing a significant disruption in supply. 
(emphasis added.) As the Court pointed out on 
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summary judgment, this clause provides neither a 
source nor a measure of contractual obligations. In 
condition-subsequent form, the clause recognizes a 
condition the occurrence of which would excuse 
Gilson's exclusivity commitment to Rainin. It would 
be manifestly unreasonable to say that a provision 
of the agreement which does not obligate a party to 
act or refrain from acting provides the measure by 
which that party's good faith is to be judged. Were 
this clause to provide the sole measure of 
defendants' good faith, then defendants would not 
be obligated to perform their contractual obligations 
in good faith. In effect, defendants' interpretation 
disclaims the duty of good faith contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 401.102(3), which expressly precludes such 
a result. 
Implied Covenant of Best Efforts 
Plaintiffs maintain that no reasonable juror could 
have answered "no" to the first question: "Did 
defendant Rainin materially breach its obligation to 
use its best efforts to promote and sell plaintiff 
Gilson's Pipetman?" Defendants now recognize that 
they were obligated to use best efforts to promote 
and sell Gilson's Pipetman pipettes. Prior to the 
liability verdict they had maintained that they had 
no such duty or, in the alternative, that their 
compliance with any duty to use best efforts should 
be measured by the clause which they now propose 
to be the proper measure of their obligation to 
promote and sell in good faith. Defendants argue 
that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict that they did not materially 
breach their obligation to use best efforts. They 
argue further that in light of their obligation to use 
best efforts, a separate question directed to their 
good faith should not have been asked. 
Defendants' concession that Rainin was obligated 
to use its best efforts to promote and sell Gilson's 
Pipetman pipettes verifies, a fortiori, that it was 
obligated to promote and sell in good faith. The 
"best efforts" standard implied in exclusive dealing 
agreements by Wis. Stat. § 402.306(2) obligates the 
parties "to use reasonable diligence as well as good 
faith in their performance of the contract." Wis. 
Stat. § 402.306 cmt. 
The Seventh Circuit has observed that courts 
applying the best-efforts and good-faith standards 
have at times "muddled" the two concepts. Beraha, 
956 F.2d at 1443. Professor Farnsworth describes 
the distinction between the two as follows: 
*5 Because courts sometimes confuse the 
standard of best efforts with that of good faith, it 
will be well at the outset to make plain the 
distinction between the two standards. Good faith 
is a standard that has honesty and fairness at its 
core and that is imposed on every party to a 
contract. Best efforts is a standard that has 
diligence as its essence and is imposed only on 
those contracting parties that have undertaken 
such performance. The two standards are distinct 
and that of best efforts is the more exacting. 
E. Allan Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One's 
Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in Contract Law, 
46 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1984) (discussing Zilg v. 
Prentice-Hall, 111 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.1983)). 
At trial, the Court understood plaintiffs to suggest 
breaches both of the diligence and good faith 
aspects of Rainin's duty to use best efforts. Wary of 
"muddling" these distinct aspects, the Court 
adopted plaintiffs' suggestion to provide each with 
its own instruction and corresponding special 
verdict question. As discussed, one question 
focused on Rainin's good faith performance of its 
obligation to promote and sell Gilson's pipettes. The 
other, titled "best efforts," addressed the additional 
diligence aspect of Rainin's duty: 
BREACH OF CONTRACT: DUTY OF BEST 
EFFORTS 
The contract between Rainin and Gilson requires 
Rainin to use its "best efforts" to promote and sell 
Gilson pipettes. The duty to use best efforts 
requires Rainin to use reasonable efforts and due 
diligence in the promotion of Gilson's pipettes. 
Gilson claims that Rainin breached its best efforts 
obligation by using various marketing and sales 
methods to convince customers to purchase 
Rainin pipettes instead of Gilson pipettes or to 
replace Gilson pipettes with Rainin pipettes. 
There is no dispute that the parties' agreement 
permits Rainin to manufacture pipettes which 
compete with Gilson pipettes. Nevertheless, 
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Rainin's privilege to compete with Gilson is not 
absolute. The means that Rainin may employ to 
compete with Gilson are limited by Rainin's 
obligation to use reasonable efforts and due 
diligence in the promotion and sale of Gilson's 
pipettes. Although Rainin has a general right to 
promote the sale of a competing brand of pipettes 
and thereby lessen Gilson's share of the market, 
there will be a point where Rainin's methods are 
so manifestly harmful to Gilson as to justify the 
finding that Rainin has breached its obligation to 
Gilson. 
While compliance with the "best efforts" standard 
requires good faith plus diligence, this instruction 
directed the jury to consider only the additional 
diligence aspect of the obligation. The instruction 
makes no mention of the "good faith" limits implicit 
in Rainin's duty to diligently promote and sell 
Gilson's pipettes. That aspect was separately 
presented in the other instruction and special verdict 
question. 
At trial, plaintiffs' argument focused on Rainin's 
disparaging use of the Pipetman to promote and sell 
its own pipettes. Plaintiffs' argument sounded in the 
bad faith associated with a party's failure to honor 
the other party's reasonable promise-induced 
expectations in the performance of its contractual 
obligations. The evidence presented thus nestled 
more comfortably in the good faith instruction. 
Plaintiffs presented less, if any, evidence directed at 
the additional "diligence" aspect imposed by the 
more exacting best efforts standard. Plaintiffs' 
principal concern was not nonfeasance or 
competence but malfeasance. Thus the jury 
reasonably found in plaintiffs' favor as to the good 
faith verdict question and rejected a finding that 
Rainin had breached the additional diligence 
requirement imposed by the duty to use best efforts. 
As a matter of law, however, defendants' material 
failure to promote and sell in good faith violated 
both the "good faith" and the more exacting "best 
efforts" standards. Consequently, plaintiffs' Rule 50 
motion will be granted. 
Damages Verdict 
*6 At the close of the damages phase of trial, the 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No 
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jury awarded damages to Gilson S.A.S. for lost 
profits in the amount of $500,000. Defendants 
maintain that Gilson S.A.S. is not entitled to recover 
lost profits from Rainin because Rainin was not 
obligated to purchase Pipetman pipettes from 
Gilson. 
Plaintiff Dr. Robert E. Gilson and his father Dr. 
Warren E. Gilson are the named co-inventors of 
U.S. Patent No. 3,827,305, which was filed for 
certain adjustable volume manual pipettes on 
October 24, 1972. In December 1972 Warren and 
Robert Gilson entered into a "Capital Gains License 
Agreement" with Rainin Instrument Co., Inc. Under 
this 1972 Agreement, the Gilsons granted Rainin 
the exclusive right in the United States to use the 
method described in the '305 patent and technical 
information relating to processes, invention and 
methods relating to the manufacture of pipettes 
under the patent, including "the exclusive and 
perpetual right to make, use and sell under the 
aforesaid technical information and patent 
application." The '305 patent issued on August 6, 
1974. 
Gilson S.A.S. has manufactured the pipette 
disclosed by the '305 patent since 1972. Gilson 
owns the "Gilson" and "Pipetman" trademarks, 
under which this pipette was promoted and sold by 
Rainin throughout the United States. Throughout 
the course of the parties' relationship, Gilson S.A.S. 
has sold its pipettes to Rainin for distribution to the 
public. The Gilson Pipetman pipette is the largest 
selling pipette in the United States. Known for its 
reliability and durability, it has become the industry 
standard. Gilson S.A.S. realized a profit from 
selling its Pipetman pipettes to Rainin. Additionally, 
Robert E. Gilson and the Wisconsin Alumni 
Research Foundation received what the parties 
describe as a "royalty" of $8.50 for every Pipetman 
pipette that Rainin sold. 
Defendants argue that Rainin was not obligated to 
purchase pipettes from Gilson because Rainin could 
manufacture them itself. Consequently, they argue 
that Gilson had no expectation of profit resulting 
from their sale to Rainin. 
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Defendants' argument overstates its rights under the 
1972 Agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, Rainin 
could manufacture and sell the pipette disclosed by 
the '305 patent. It could not, however, promote and 
sell its pipettes under the "Gilson" and "Pipetman" 
names because it had no right to use these 
trademarks in connection with the promotion and 
sale of any pipette not manufactured by Gilson. Nor 
could it do so when the '305 patent expired in 1991. 
Rainin was the exclusive U.S. distributor of the 
Pipetman pipette. As a consequence of this 
exclusive distributorship arrangement, Rainin was 
obligated to promote and sell Pipetman pipettes. 
Because Gilson was the only source of Pipetman 
pipettes, Rainin was obligated to purchase Pipetman 
pipettes from Gilson. Defendants' motion will be 
denied. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' renewed motion 
for judgment on as a matter of law is DENIED. 
*7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs' 
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is 
GRANTED. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORP. MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MARK JONES Case No. 980900576 
Judge Fratto 
V. 
UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
JOHN FIFE, LYLE D. HURD, JR. 
GERRY BROWN 
Following trial, the matter was taken under advisement. The claims and issues are herein 
addressed as the Utah Court of Appeals has remanded them. 
The grant of summary judgment was affirmed for .First Claim for Relief (Breach of 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Against URI, Fife and Hurd), and Seventh 
Claim for Relief (Declaring the Purported Options are Null and Void Against URI, John Fife, 
David Fife, Hurd and Brown). These claims are now evaluated to determine whether the actions 
taken by U.R.I, in approving an employment contract for John Fife, and in nullifying stock 
options for Hurd, Brown and Fife occurred because of plaintiffs' lawsuit. 
The court finds that the Board, at a meeting on October 24,1996, tabled the issue of the 
employment contract until thirty days after the shareholders meeting on December 11, 1997. The 
lawsuit was filed on January 20, 1998, and the Board approved the agreement on February 27, 
1998. 
The agreement is perfunctory, its only provision, setting the amount of compensation, 
deals with the only specific provision required by the June 26, 1996 settlement agreement. At the 
shareholders meeting of March 8,1999, John Fife makes an admission that there was approval of 
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the contract, "...in an effort to resolve a legal claim brought by Mr. Jones." Both the timing and 
substance of events lends weight to plaintiffs'claim. 
Concerning the stock options, there was evidence showing that the additional options 
were never intended, resulted from misunderstandings, were never exercised, and no benefit 
therefrom inured to defendants. Defendants, even with Jones' urging, did not believe there to be 
any need or importance in setting the books and records straight concerning these options. 
They may be right. However, the mandate is to evaluate whether action was taken as a 
result of the lawsuit. 
The timing of the waiver of the stock options is compelling. The court finds that after 
urging and inaction, to either disavow or ratify the options, no action was taken until after filing 
the lawsuit 
Consequently, the court is convinced to a preponderance of the evidence that both the 
approval of the Fife employment contract and the waiver nullifying the additional options 
occurred because of the lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs' fourth claim ties the additional stock options as compensation for an 
employment agreement between URI and Hurd, and asserts that failure to terminate the contract 
is a breach of the settlement agreement. The Court of Appeal's mandate requires this court to 
determine whether such a contract was "effectuated." 
Plaintiffs theory is that the additional stock options were compensation for employment, 
and reflecting those additional options in the corporate record not only demonstrate an 
employment contract, but also show it was "effectuated.". 
Hurd had done work for URI in the past that was beyond his duties as a Board member. 
2 
^7\\a 
As indicated above, there was considerable speculation, and several alternative theories, 
explaining the additional options: gift, mistake, misunderstanding, clerical error. 
There was little evidence that connected the options, beyond the fact that there was a 
record of options, to any employment contract with Hurd. Specifically, there was no nexis 
between value of the options and past work for the corporation. 
There was an anticipation of employment, but no connection that convincing established 
that the stock was compensation for the employment, and, consequently, that the employment 
agreement had been made effective. 
Plaintiff has no cause of action. 
In summary, the court is not convinced of an "effectuated" employment contract with 
Hurd, but does find that the stock options were waived and voided, and the Fife employment 
agreement entered into because of the lawsuit. 
Second Claim for Relief alleges a breach by defendants of a contractual obligation to use 
their best efforts to "account for, pay, compromise, unwind, and/or terminate all existing 
contractual relationships" with Morgan Gas Company. Plaintiffs' have the burden of proof to 
demonstrate, to a preponderance of the evidence, that defendants did not use their best efforts to 
achieve this goal. 
In determining what constitutes "best efforts," particular circumstances must be 
considered. Each defendant is in a different position to exert an effort to accomplish the goal. 
Where several people are working toward a goal, they cannot work at cross-purposes. 
Consequently, the laboring oar might properly be in the hands of one person, the others best 
serving by doing nothing. 
3 
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Defendants also had a fiduciary obligation to accomplish their contractual obligation to 
the benefit of URI. Severing the relationship with MGO would be a relatively easy task, if URI's 
best interests are ignored. 
The unwinding of URI's relationship with MGO is a business proposition involving 
business decisions and strategies. It is difficult to second guess whether one strategy or decision 
was incorrect or represented a failure to exert best efforts. John Fife's approach was to first 
marshal, organize and analyze the records of URI. He then resolved specific situations both 
directly and indirectly connected to the MGO unwinding, before working on a global resolution. 
John Fife, as part of his management obligations, had many responsibilities. He 
prioritized both the tasks within the unwinding process, and in relation to all activities connected 
with his performance as president of the corporation. 
The MGO unwinding did not occupy the top most priority of all his responsibilities. 
However, "best efforts" does not mean to elevate the task above all others. It means to make the 
best effort possible in the context of the circumstances and situation. Further, prioritizing within 
the unwinding process is appropriate. Fife made determinations that some things needed to be 
done before other things. It is difficult to find a failure of best efforts, even if there are legitimate 
concerns with the order of priority. 
Plaintiffs' argue that the lengthy period of time wherein URI appears to have no contact 
with MGO is evidence of failure of best efforts. Although there was no direct communication 
with some members of the MGO team during this period, contact with John Morgan did 
continue. Mr. Morgan appears to have been a key to successfully concluding the unwinding. 
Some of his concerns were considered and actions to resolve them were taken during this period. 
4 
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When considering strategies, priorities, the other actions taken, the court cannot conclude 
that this period of no communication represents a failure of best efforts. 
Consequently, the court is not convinced to a preponderance of the evidence that best 
efforts were not made by defendants, and finds no cause of action. 
Plaintiff seeks in his tenth claim, reimbursement for certain "expenses", including 
consultation with attorneys, administrative work, telephone and the like, generally characterized 
as expenses incurred to fulfill his duties as a member of the Board of Directors. 
The court finds that URI is not obligated to pay these charges. 
Article III, Sec. 9 of the Articles of Incorporation limit reimbursement of expenses to 
those incurred for "....attendance at each meeting...," and then only by resolution of the Board. 
The member is entitled to that which was expended to attend a meeting.(transportation, meals, 
hotels while away from home. If attending by telephone, long distance charges) Reimbursement 
of expenses incurred to perform duties, or in preparation for attending a meeting, are not 
sanctioned by this provision. 
The court finds that other Board members were neither incurring nor billing similar 
expenses. 
Plaintiff sent several invoices seeking reimbursement. There appears to have been no 
attempt to obtain a resolution from the Board for either prior authorization of, or to pay that 
which had been incurred. There is no resolution that authorizes Jones to incur these types of 
expenses. 
Fife informed plaintiff on several occasions that the invoices would not be reimbursed. 
Plaintiff continued to incur and bill the expense. There was no action or representation by any 
5 
defendant that could reasonably mislead plaintiff into believing that these expenses were or 
would be authorized. 
There were discussions about payment of both Board members' "expenses," and attorney 
fees and costs incurred by individual member associated with litigation. There is nothing in those 
discussions, or in resolutions approving attorney fees and litigation costs for some members, that 
convinces the court of some implied or de facto authorization of plaintiff s claim. The only 
discemable policy toward members' expenses beyond attending meetings, was to reimburse for 
attorney fees and cost if the litigation was associated with Board membership. 
Accordingly, plaintiff has no cause of action. 
Having determined the prevailing party on each remanded issue and claim, the award of 
attorney fees must now be resolved. The clerk is directed to set a telephonic scheduling 
conference. 
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1. Attorneys fees and costs are awarded to the Plaintiffs in the amount of S34.834.02 
as caicdated in the P l a i n s ' Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs Pursuant to Order of 
August 4,2004. 
awarded to the Defendants in the amount of 2. Attorneys fees and costs are 
, i * J • ^Defendants' Statement of Attorneys Fees and Costs. SI 10,187.77, as calculated in the Defendants OUJ. 
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final judgment shall issue in favor • 
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